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INTRODUCTION

As the use of non-compete agreements has risen drastically in the employment
context, 2 employers are imposing non-compete agreements without also providing3
written employment contracts, or any other type of job security, to employees.
While non-compete agreements have traditionally been associated with high-skill
employees, many employees-most without a bachelor's degree -are now subject
to enforceable non-compete agreements. 4 Employers often justify non-compete
agreements as necessary to protect confidential information regarding their products
5
or services, or as an employee retention strategy. The retention justification fails,
when employees do not have a complementary promise of job security through a
written employment contract. Some courts have acknowledged this lack of
justification for a non-compete agreements by holding it unenforceable where an
at-will employee has been fired without cause.6 The underlying theory of holding
such non-compete agreements unenforceable is a lack of equity in enforcing an7
services.
agreement against employees when the employer no longer wants their
not be
should
agreement
The same theory applies in this setting: a non-compete
employee
that
find
not
does
employer
the
if
enforceable against an employee
valuable enough to offer a written employment contract. Under a written
employment contract, an employee usually receives job security, as the employee is
no longer considered at-will, and therefore can only be fired for just cause.' The
power differential between an employer and an employee is highlighted by an
employment relationship without a written employment contract, which provides a
benefit to the employer in retaining an employee's skills, but does not provide a
comparable benefit-like job security-to the employee. While this differential is
somewhat offset by the ability of employees to prove they had a verbal employment
9
contract and therefore cannot be fired without cause, it would prevent litigation costs
if these employment contracts were in written form prior to any dispute.

2
Evan
Starr
et
al.,
Noncompetes
in
the
U.S.
Labor
Force
2019)
18-013,
No.
Paper
Research
Econ.,
&
Law
Mich.
of
(Univ.
=
https:/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN ID3248705 code2006805.pdf?abstractid 2625714&
mirid 1&type 2 [https:/perma.cc/6SVL-QUG4] ("Nearly I in 5 labor force participants were bound by
noncompetes in 2014...."); Conor Dougherty, flow Noncompete ClausesKeep Workers Locked in, N.Y.
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/noncompete-clauses.html
TIMES (May 13,
[https://perma.cc/CS4G-B7NQ].
3Starr et al., supra note 2, at 30 (observing that only seven percent of employees interviewed received
assurance of job security).
4 ld.at 2 3.
' Non-Compete Agreements, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/employmenthiring-employmentcontracts/noncompete-agreements/ [https://perma.ec/B95A-AFW8].
'E.g. Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App'x 769, 771 72 (6th Cir. 2007).
7 Id. at 772.
Employment Contractsand Compensation Agreement, FIN)LAW, https://employment.findlaw.com/hiringprocess/employment-contracts-and-compensation-agreements.html [https://perma.cc/RYX8-7JUI I].
' See Lantech.com, 247 F. App'x at 770, 772 (noting that the plaintiff claimed he only signed the
non-compete agreement after being told the job with Lantech was a "life-long relationship" and that the
plaintiffs termination was "abrupt, peremptory, and without explanation").
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In order for a non-compete agreement to be considered enforceable by the courts,
it must be related to a "legitimate business interest" and properly limited in scope to
address that legitimate business interest.")o Courts analyze whether an employer has
a "legitimate business interest" by looking to the facts and circumstances to see if
"the employee would gain an unfair advantage in future competition with the
employer."1 This inquiry is typically aimed at protecting an employer's confidential
information, but some courts approach the inquiry more liberally to ensure equity for
the employee. 2 In this scenario, equity is guided by the circumstances surrounding
the employee's firing, specifically if the employer "discharged the employee
unfairly."' 3 Because of this more liberal approach, as well as courts' reluctance to
enforce non-compete agreements, there is an opportunity to further the equity
evaluation when addressing non-compete agreements. Courts should adopt an
approach where non-compete agreements will not be enforced without the employer
offering a written employment contract, as there can be no "legitimate business
interest." A "legitimate business interest" typically requires that the employee will
be able to "gain an unfair advantage in future competition with the employer."' 4 It
logically follows that if an employer discharges an employee without cause, it has
no legitimate business interest in utilizing that employee's skills or "advantages" any
longer, as the employer has decided the employee cannot provide any further value
to its business. Using the "legitimate business interest" prong in order to accomplish
public policy directives will guarantee that the doctrine stays largely the same.
Notably, it will ensure that courts will be able to apply the new standard with ease,
as it fits in with the current doctrinal requirements. One scholar has argued that an
employer's bargaining power should be considered when evaluating the
enforceability of non-compete agreements.' While this subjective approach has
merit, it will be much easier for courts to apply the objective standard of evaluating
whether or not an employee has a written employment contract when deciding if a
non-compete agreement should be enforced.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief overview of non-compete agreements and
what is required for the agreements to be enforceable. Part II will discuss how courts
have addressed the equity problem between employers and employees in the
non-compete setting and the "legitimate business interest" prong, which is necessary
to satisfy for a non-compete agreement to be enforced. It will also address how the
"legitimate business interest" prong has been used as a vehicle to tackle public policy
concerns. Part III will consider the adoption of making non-compete agreements
unenforceable without the employer offering a written employment contract, as there
Navajo Air, L.L.C. v. Crye Precision, L.L.C., 318 F. Supp. 3d 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
I E.g. Lantech.com, 247 F. App'x at 772, 774.
Id. at 774 ("[A] Kentucky court may look to the circumstances in which an employee was discharged in
deciding whether to grant an injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete, and may refuse to enforce an
otherwise valid agreement if the court finds that the employer discharged the employee unfairly.").
4 Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 644.
's See generally Kate O'Neill, 'Should I Sta ' or Should I Go?'
Covenants Not to Compete in a Down
Economy: A Proposalfor Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HAST1NGS BUs. L.J. 83 (2010)
(arguing that unequal power dynamics between employer and employee diminish an employee's bargaining
power to obtain a fhir contract, as opposed to being subjected to unfair non-compete agreements).
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cannot be a legitimate business interest. It will further discuss the likelihood of courts
adopting this new approach.
I. OVERVIEW OF NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

Non-compete agreements are typically enforceable against an employee if they
are justified by a legitimate business interest and are limited in scope to protect 6the
legitimate business interest in: duration, geographic reach, and scope of activity. A
non-compete agreement is related to a legitimate business interest if the facts are
"such that without the covenant, the employee would gain an unfair advantage in
7
future competition with the employer."' An inquiry into this advantage includes:
(1) whether the employer provided the employee with specialized
training; (2) whether the employee is given access to trade or business
secrets or other confidential information; and (3) whether the employer's
customers tend to associate the employer's business with the employee
repeated contacts with the customers on behalf of
due to the employee's
5
the employer. '

This inquiry focuses on protecting the employer's investment in the employee
and, more importantly, protecting the employer's confidential information that may

9
be a vital part of its business.' It is important that the restriction does not only
sake of prohibiting
prohibit fair competition with the previous employer for the
20
interest."
"legitimate
further
some
be
must
competition; there
As for the scope of non-compete agreements, they are typically limited by a
2
reasonableness inquiry. ' This inquiry includes "the whole subject matter of the
contract, the kind and character of business, its location, the purpose to be
accomplished by the restriction, and all circumstances which show the intention of
2 2
the parties and which must have entered into the making of the contract. 1 Individual
determine
to
facts and circumstances are taken into account in order
23
supporting
consideration
reasonableness. At least one court has also included "the
the agreements; the threatened danger to the employer in the absence of such an
agreement; the economic hardship imposed on the employee by such a covenant; and
whether or not such a covenant should be inimical to public interest" as factors in
evaluating reasonableness.21 Public interest is one of the more important factors in
evaluating the scope of a non-compete agreement, which is usually most relevant in
25
Due to the possibility of the non-compete
reference to healthcare providers.

'6

Navajo Air, L.L.C. v Crye Precision, L.L.C., 318 F. Supp. 3d 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Vantage Tech., 17 S.W.3d at 644.
l Id.

'9 Id. at 644-45o Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P,2d 1277, 1281 (Ariz. 1999) (en bane).
Reeves v. Sargeant, 21 S.E.2d 184, 187 88 (S.C. 1942).
22 Id. at 188.
-3 id.
24 E.g. Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1966).

25 Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1281 82.
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agreements damaging public interest, non-compete agreements in this context are
evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard. 6
As referenced above, states that non-compete agreements must be created with
good consideration. 27 Typically, the offer of employment is contingent on signing
the non-compete agreement, and the employment itself constitutes the consideration.
It is unlikely that continued employment is enough consideration to bind employees
who sign non-compete agreements after they start work with an employer. 28 But
9
there are cases that hold otherwise .2
Non-compete agreements are generally litigated through preliminary
injunctions.3" If the court does not issue a preliminary injunction, the harm is realized
as soon as the employee begins working for a competing enterprise of the original
employer. For a preliminary injunction to be issued, the Supreme Court has said that
it is necessary for the party asking for the injunction to establish the following
factors: "that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest."3 Because most
employers attempt to enforce non-compete agreements through preliminary
injunction, they must illustrate not only that there is a legitimate business purpose
for the non-compete agreement and that its scope is reasonable, but also the factors
necessary for a preliminary injunction to be issued. Additionally, because
non-compete agreements are restraints on trade, the burden of proof for enforcing a
32
non-compete agreement generally lies with the employer.
Employers benefit from the use of non-compete agreements in a variety of ways.
The agreements can help preserve the value of the employer's assets, protect and
retain clients, ensure the value of the company for future sales, protect confidential
information or gain trade secret protection, and encourage investment in employee
training. The benefits for employees are not quite as clear. In order to compensate
employees for the restrictions placed on them by non-compete agreements, it would
not be too large a burden on employers to provide some form ofjob security through
a written employment agreement. In exchange for an enforceable non-compete
agreement, employees could only be fired for just cause under the written agreement.

26 Id. at 1283.
27 E.g. Rem Metals Corp. v. Logan, 565 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Or. 1977) (quoting Eldridge v. Johnston,

245 P.2d 239, 250 (Or. 1952)).
21 Jeffrey A. Simmons,
ConsMideraon,

FOLiEY

&

Non-Competes for Existing

LARDNER

LILP:

LAB.

&

EMP.

Employees
L.

PERSP.

May
BLOG

Require Additional
(Jan.

22,

2018),

https //www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/01/noncompetes-for-existing-employees-mayrequire-add [https://perma.ec/B6VW-MMWV].
2)E.g., Lucht's Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Homer, 255 P.3d 1058, 1061 63 (Colo 2011); Lake Land
Emp't Grp. v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 33 (Ohio 2004).
' Norman D. Bishara et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of'Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive
Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1,46 (2015).
" Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7,20 (2008).
32Omniplex World Servs. Corp. v. U.S Investigations Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (Va. 2005).
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Traditionally, an employment agreement between an employer and an employee
33
is an implied agreement that constitutes at-will employment. Most states have
at-will employment as a default, with the exception of Montana, which provides that
34
At-will employment "can be
employees may not be wrongfully dismissed.
35
terminated by either party at any time for any reason." The employment agreement
has no specific duration, and the terms of employment can be changed at the will of
the employer. 3 6 For these reasons, at-will employment primarily favors employers
and allows them flexibility in their hiring and firing processes, including the ability
37
to terminate an employee suddenly and without cause. While some states have
addressed this issue by providing relief through the court systems-through
recognizing implied-in-fact contracts where the employer made promises to continue
38
this fails to cover a large portion of employees. The
the employee's employment
alternative, employment terminable for just cause, typically means that the employee
can only be terminated for conduct stated in the written employment agreement
39
(which can include employee handbooks) or conduct that "a reasonable employer,
acting in good faith, would regard as good and sufficient reason for terminating the
4°
services of an employee, as distinguished from an arbitrary whim or caprice." A
minority of states allow the just cause standard to be met as long as the employer
41
gives "a proper reason for dismissal." Because an employer's justification for
terminating an employee only needs to be reasonable, this could include anything
from specific, conduct to "legitimate economic reasons."42 This would still give
employers wide latitude to discipline their employees and flexibility in times of
economic distress.
As non-compete agreements are almost entirely governed by state case law, each
state has unique approaches to enforcing the agreements. The same basic principal
of enforcement, however, spans across most states: there must be a legitimate
43
business interest and the scope of the agreement must be reasonable. It is important
to note that some specific states have more novel approaches. For example, New
York will not enforce a non-compete agreement if an at-will employee is terminated
without cause. 4 This approach is aimed at balancing the equities between an

3 Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms, Implied
Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84, 84 (2007).
34 Id at 90.

" Id. at 84,
36 id.
37 id.

" Id.

at 89.
31 Woolley v, Ioffmann-La Roche, Inc. 99 N.J. 284, 302 (N.J. 1985).
4'0Ahmann v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 767 N.W.2d 104, 111 (Neb. 2009).

"' Gaudio v. Griffin Health Servs. Corp., 733 A.2d 197, 208 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc,, 427 A,2d 385, 386 (Conn. 1980)).

42Uintah Basin Med, Ctr. v. Hlardy, 110 P.3d 168, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
4' Navajo Air, L.L.C. v. Crye Precision, L.L.C., 318 F. Supp. 3d 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
44 See Buchanan Capital Mkts., L.L.C. v. DeLucca, 41 N.Y.S.3d 229, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016)
("[S]uch covenants are not enforceable if the employer [] does not demonstrate 'continued willingness to
employ the party covenanting not to compete.' (quoting Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 397 NL.E2d 358, 360 61 (N.Y. 1979))).
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employee and an employer.45 In California, non-compete agreements are unlawful,
unless there is a statutory exception. 46 These statutory exceptions include-if in
conjunction with the sale or dissolution of the company-allowing non-compete
agreements for business owners, between partners in a partnership, and between
members of a limited liability company.47

I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS UNDER TIIE
LEGITIMATE

BUSINESS INT EREST PRONG

A. Approaches to Addressing the Equity Problem in Non-Compete Agreements
In evaluating whether a non-compete agreement is enforceable, equity is not
often overtly mentioned, but does play a role in the analysis. Courts look critically
on whether or not the employer terminated the employee without cause," while
another looks at the manner of the firing,49 and still another evaluates the power
differential in bargaining between the employee and the employer.5" While equity is
an important factor, the differing approaches of jurisdictions can lead to different
results in the protection of employees. By using an objective standard, written
contracts providing for non-compete agreements to be unenforceable if the employee
is fired without cause, these inconsistencies in the protection of employees would be
limited.
For non-compete agreements to be enforceable in New York, the employer must
5
show a "continued willingness to employ the party covenanting not to compete." '
In Buchanan Capital Markets, L.L.C. v. DeLucca, the Supreme Court of New York
Appellate Divsion declined to grant a preliminary injunction enforcing non-compete
agreements entered into by past Buchanan employees.5 2 While Buchanan had lost
new customers to the past employees, the court reasoned that this could be mitigated
by money damages, instead of an injunction. 3 Because the employer did not show a
"continued willingness to employ" the employees, as they were terminated without
cause, equity weighed in favor of the employees, and the court refused to grant the
54
preliminary injunction.
Similarly, in Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, the Sixth Circuit declined to enforce a
non-compete agreement when an employee's termination was described as "abrupt,

4 Id.at 230.
SSCO"

WENNER,SCItNADER HARRISON SFGA

& Liwis LLP, NON-COMPI i LAWS: CALIFORNIA

§ 3 (2019), Westlaw Practical Law Labor & Employment.
47 id. § I.

41E.g Buchanan Capital Mkts., 41 N.Y.S.3d at 230.
" Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App'x 769, 772 73 (6th Cir. 2007).
-'( Gann v. Morris, 596 P.2d 43, 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
" Buchanan Capital MAkts., 41 N.Y.S.3d at 230 (quoting Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.,
397 N F 2d 358, 360 61 (N.Y. 1979)).
53 I &

54IC.(quoting Mlerrill lvnch, 397 N.E.2d at 360 61).
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peremptory, and without explanation."55 Yarbrough was employed by Lantech and
had signed a non-compete agreement prohibiting him from working for any company
involved in stretch wrapping or other equipment or manufacturing used by Lantech
for two years following his termination. 56 Prior to his termination, Yarbrough was
57
placed on a ninety-day performance plan to improve his sales. After thirty days on
he had increased sales and "was demonstrating
the plan, his manager noted 5that
'motivation' and 'passion."' 8 He was terminated shortly after that review for
missing work and not making an impact, which the district court found was
demonstrably false.59 Because of the suddenness of Yarbrough's firing, as well as
the lack of justification, the court found that "equities disfavor" the attempt by
6
0
Lantech to enforce the non-compete agreement through a preliminary injunction.
The court found that the inequity alone was "a sufficient, 'independent ground,' for
determining that Lantech was not likely to succeed on the merits" and therefore was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction. 6' This case reinforces the proposition that
of the
Kentucky courts could consider the circumstances surrounding the discharge
62
employee when deciding whether to enforce a non-compete agreement.
In Pennsylvania, employment covenants not to compete are "subjected to a more
stringent test of reasonableness" (i.e., strict scrutiny) because of the "greater hardship
imposed upon an employe[e] ."63 In Morgan 's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci,

Morgan's Home Equipment employed a number of traveling salesmen who had
"confidential route[s]" provided to them by their employer. 64 After employees of
Morgan's Home Equipment had signed non-compete agreements, however, they left
the company and began soliciting customers. 65 In reviewing the reasonableness of
the agreements not to compete, the court went on to recognize that covenants not to
compete in the employment context, versus covenants not to compete in the sale of
66
business context, impose "greater hardship" on employees. This hardship includes
the employee's inability to "practic[e] his [or her] trade or skill," his or her
experience not transferring to the next job, "few resources in reserve to fall back
upon," and the difficulty of moving "to a location beyond the area of potential
67
competition with his [or her] former employer." The court found that because of
the "undue hardship" on Morgan's past employees, the non-compete agreements
were unenforceable.

68

Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App'x 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lantech.eom, L.L.C.
No. 3:06-CV-334-JDM, 2006 WL 3323222, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2006)).
v. Yarbrough,
5
6 Id.at 771.
57
Id. at 770- 71.
5
' Id, at 771.
59
d.at 771 72.
60 Id. at 769 70 (quoting Lantech com, 2006 WL 3323222, at *2).
61 Id. at 773 (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 774 (citing Crowell v.Woodruff, 245 S.W.2d 447, 449 50 (Ky. 1951)).
63Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa. 1957).
64Id. at 841.
65Id.
66 Id. at 846.
67 id.
61Id.at 846 47.
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Similar to Pennsylvania, in Arizona, courts take into account the hardship
non-compete agreements place on employees, as well as the "uneven bargaining
9
position of the parties.""o
Louisiana takes this approach one step further by enacting
statutory provisions that almost eliminate the enforcement of non-compete
agreements entirely. The statute makes non-compete agreements "null and void,"
unless they fall into a few narrow exceptions.7" A Louisiana court illustrated the
purpose of this statute by observing that individuals should have the freedom "to
better themselves in our free-enterprise society, where liberty of the individual is
guaranteed." 7 It additionally recognizes "the disparity in bargaining power"
between an employee "fearful of losing his means of livelihood," who therefore feels
obligated to sign the non-compete agreement in order to obtain the job, and an
employer who can ensure the employee may only work for it in any particular field. 12
As for the employer's protection, the statute is only meant to protect an employer
when it has "invested substantial sums in special training of the employee or in
advertising the employee's connection with his business."73 Broadly, the purpose of
the statute protects the employee from any difference in bargaining power and
protects the employer in situations where they have made a substantial investment.
These approaches concerned with equity are similar to the suggested approach of
refusing to enforce non-compete agreements if the employer has not provided a
written employment contract to the employee terminable only for cause. While New
York uses equity as a vehicle to address without cause firings,74 the Sixth Circuit
uses the requirements for issuing a preliminary injunction to address equity in the
non-compete setting.75 Similarly, Pennsylvania takes into account the hardship
non-compete agreements place on employees.7" Arizona and Louisiana courts use an
increased level of scrutiny or statutory protection to address the equity problem of
differentials in bargaining power.77 While the Arizona court and Louisiana statute
above address bargaining power, courts are typically very wary to directly address
the bargaining power differential between the employee and employer as a specific
factor in evaluating whether or not a non-compete agreement is enforceable.7"
Further, while there will usually be a bargaining power differential between a typical
employee and employer, a rule directly addressing bargaining power could
disadvantage employers when bargaining with high-powered employees, such as
executives.79 Although the end result of the above cases may be similar, the legal
reasoning behind each of these approaches to non-compete agreements differs.
" Gann v. Morris, 596 P 2d 43, 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
7"LA, STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (A)(1) (2019).
7' Nat'l Motor Club v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238, 241 (La. C. App. 1965).
72d

7d

74Buchanan Capital Mkts., L.L.C. v. DeLucca, 41 N.Y.S.3d 229, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
7' Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App'x 769, 770 (6th Cir. 2007).
76Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v, Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846 47 (Pa. 1957).
17Gann v. Morris, 596 P.2d 43, 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Nat'l Motor Club, 173 So. 2d at 241.
71 See DONALD J. ASPE.tLUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEi NONCOMPETITION LAW
§ 6:19
(2019 20 ed. 2019) ("[A] lack of bargaining power has traditionally had little independent significance in
determining the reasonableness of noncompetition agreements.").
71)h,.
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Because non-compete agreements are creatures of state law, it is important to find
an approach that conforms with the state law as it stands currently. For this reason,
using the legitimate business interest prong-which is the standard approach to noncompete agreements-to disallow the use of non-compete agreements without a
written employment agreement is an approach that can be easily adopted nationwide.
Currently, state courts use several different justifications concerned with equity and
public policy, but the outcomes of the individual approaches differ significantly. If
on
focus
instead
courts
the legitimate business prong that is already incorporated in their state common
law, the treatment of non-compete agreements could be standardized and lead to
easier-to-follow precedent.
B. Legitimate Business Interest Prongin the Non-Compete Setting,
Including Public Policy
As discussed above, in order for a non-compete agreement to be enforceable, the
employer must have a legitimate business interest that is supposed to be protected by
the agreement. 8 Courts decide whether there is a legitimate business interest by
evaluating the harm the business could suffer if the employee were to leave, which
might be in reference to loss of clients, confidential information, or training
investment. 8 Under the legitimate business interest prong, restraint of ordinary
competition is not a strong enough interest to justify the use of a non-compete
agreement. 2 At least one state even provides that non-compete agreements "will
[only] be enforced if the contract is narrowly drawn to protect the employer's
legitimate business interest, is not unduly burdensome on the employee's ability to
earn a living, and is not against public policy."83 As a matter of public policy, there
is a lack ofjustification for the usage of non-compete agreements without offering a
written employment contract, which includes only for cause termination under the
legitimate business prong.
The evaluation of the legitimate business interest prong entails a variety of
inquiries. In Omniplex World Services Corp. v. UnitedStates InvestigationsServices
Inc., the court illustrated these inquiries and their purposes.84 Under the non-compete
agreement at issue in this case, upon termination or exit, the employee could not
accept employment with any other agency that worked with the United States
85
government and required the same level of security clearance. The court explained
86
that each non-compete agreement "must be evaluated on its own merits." This
interpretation of the legitimate business interest prong is aimed at balancing an
"employee's right to secure gainful employment and the employer's legitimate

'0Navajo Air, L.L.C v. Crye Precision, L.L.C., 318 F. Supp. 3d 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
lVantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct, App. 1999).
82 Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Ariz. 1999).
3Omniplex World Servs. Corp, v. U.S. Investigations Servs., Inc., 618 S.E.2d 340, 342 (Va. 2005).
at 342 43.
14 Id.
"' Id.at 341.
86

Id. at 342.
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interest in protection from competition.""7 The court also evaluated if the
non-compete agreement was "unduly burdensome on the employee's ability to earn
a living." 8 Here, the court did not think that Omniplex had a legitimate business
reason because the non-compete agreement was overbroad, restricting the employee
from working for almost any employer that had contracted with the federal
government.8 9
Similarly, in Vantage Technology, L.L.C. v. Cross, the court analyzed the
legitimate business interest prong by looking to see whether "the employee would
gain an unfair advantage in future competition with the employer." 9 ' Factors to be
considered include:
(1) [W]hether the employer provided the employee with specialized
training; (2) whether the employee is given access to trade or business
secrets or other confidential information; and (3) whether the employer's
customers tend to associate the employer's business with the employee
due to the employee's repeated contacts with customers on behalf of tle
employer. 9
Here, Cross was a technician employed by Vantage Technology who signed a
non-compete agreement, was thoroughly trained by Vantage Technology, and had
access to confidential information prior to leaving his employment.9 2 The factors
contributing to a legitimate business interest must be "analyzed in isolation" and
"analyzed in tandem," in a type of totality of the circumstances analysis.9 3 Even
though Vantage Technology had a legitimate business interest, this still had to be
weighed against "economic hardship" and "public interest." 94 Because, under the
totality of the circumstances approach, Cross would have gained "an unfair
advantage in competition" with Vantage Technology in the future, the court found
that the non-compete agreement was enforceable. 95
In Rem Metals Corp. v. Logan, the court discussed whether an employer had a
"protectible interest," which carries the same general meaning as a legitimate
business interest, in the "skills and knowledge" of an employee that they had trained
in welding.96 Logan, after receiving training in standard welding procedures and
being refused a pay raise, went to work for a competitor of Rem Metals. 97 The court
explained that "general knowledge, skill, or facility acquired through training" by an
employer in and of itself is not a sufficient business interest to enforce a non-compete

87 ht.
88

Id.

Id. at 343.
..Vantage Tech., L.L.C. v. Cross. 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
'

8I

Id.

92Id.at 641,646.
SId. at 646.
,td. at 647 (citing Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 409 SW 2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1966)).
15Id.at 646,648.
"6 Rein Metals Corp.'v. Logan, 565 P.2d 1080, 1081 (Or. 1977),
7 Id. at 1082.
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agreement. 98 Because the burden of proof falls on the employer to demonstrate this
protectible interest, the court found that the training alone was not enough evidence
99
to enforce the non-compete agreement against Logan. In holding that skills
acquired by an employee are not enough to grant a legitimate business interest to the
employer, the court protected the employee's ability to find other gainful
employment.
Generally, public policy is a "silent partner" in non-compete agreement cases,
and largely left out of the analysis in favor of evaluating more objective factors, like
"availability of competitors and other uses for property and resources to the
recognized need to protect trade secrets." 100 These objective factors generally assess
if the employer has a legitimate business reason for enforcing the non-compete
agreement, with public policy taking a back seat in the analysis. Public policy as an
inquiry changes with "community standards and needs," however.' A Connecticut
court noted that "[t]he public policy to be applied is the public policy of the present
time."'0 2 In a work force where almost one in five workers are restricted by
non-compete agreements,"' public policy in this setting should be adapted to protect
the interests of both employees and employers.
Because the legitimate business interest prong includes not only a balancing test
4
of the employer's and employee's interests, but also takes into account all the
05
a
factors that point towards the employer having a legitimate business interest,
factor addressing whether an employee has a written employment agreement
terminable only for just cause would be easy to include in the analysis. For example,
in Virginia, where part of the legitimate business interest test is to evaluate whether
the non-compete agreement is "unduly burdensome on the employee's ability to earn
a living,"'1°6 a written employment agreement for just cause termination could easily
be discussed in this context. A legitimate business interest is broad in nature and
inquires into the equity of non-compete agreements, sometimes through an
evaluation of public policy and other factors, without specifically evaluating the
power differential between an employee and an employer. These specific
characteristics of the legitimate business prong analysis make it an attractive route
to address the power differential through a more objective approach that will not
disadvantage employers.
Instead of using this objective approach, one scholar suggests that an employer's
07
bargaining power is specifically included in the analysis as a subjective factor. The
problem with this approach is the subjectivity of the analysis. If, instead, a court
simply must answer whether there is a written employment agreement as part of the
" Id. at 1083 (quoting Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 IIARV. L. REV.
625, 652 (1960)).
9 id.at 1084.
'0 ASPELUND & BECKNER, supra note 78, at § 6:23 (footnotes omitted).
01 Id
102Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 108 A. 541, 543 (Conn. 1919).
'0' Starr etal., supra note 2.
104 Omniplex World Servs. Corp.
115 Vantage

v. U.S. Investigations Servs., 618 S.E,2d 340, 342 (Va. 2005).
Tech., L.L.C. v.Cross, 17 SW.3d 637, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

1O6mniplex WorldServs. Corp., 618 S.E.2d at 342.

1'7O'Neill, supro note 15, at 118.
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legitimate business prong, there is less room for error and greater guidance from
precedent. When fact finders look subjectively about the power differential between
employees and employers, there is more room for error-specifically if a jury may
be more sympathetic to the employee.
C. Lack of Considerationas an Approach to Limit Non-Compete Agreements
To address some of the equity problems raised in a non-compete setting, some
courts look to see if there is adequate consideration for the agreement. Typically, the
offer for employment is considered adequate consideration to make a non-compete
agreement enforceable.'
While lack of consideration has been used as a vehicle to
avoid the enforcement of non-compete agreements in the past,' 0 9 courts are trending
away from this. For example, at least one state has said that "continued employment"
in exchange for signing a non-compete agreement is adequate consideration in the
non-compete context.'" If there must be some additional consideration, beyond
continued employment, then the employee would have had some net benefit that
resulted due to signing the non-compete agreement. Now, because "continued
employment" may be enough consideration to satisfy the enforcement of a
non-compete agreement, the power differential between employer and employee can
no longer be adequately addressed through a consideration analysis. Therefore, a
different approach is needed. Even in those states where continued employment is
not enough consideration, the power differential between employer and employee
prior to entering into a non-compete agreement is still at issue."' Because noncompete agreements are typically used as a condition of employment, if an employee
refuses to sign a non-compete agreement, it is likely that she will not receive the job
from the employer.
1II.

NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE UNENFORCEABLE WHEN TIlE

EMPLOYER DOES NOT OFFER A WRITTEN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AS

No

Ti IERE IS

LEGITIMATE BUSINESS INTEREST

While non-compete agreements are based primarily in state law, courts across
the United States should adopt an approach that non-compete agreements are not
enforceable unless the employer offers a written employment agreement for
termination only for cause as there is no legitimate business interest. Adopting such
an approach would address the problem of equity while also providing an answer
that could easily fit into existing frameworks found in state precedent. This approach
would standardize outcomes in non-compete agreement cases, give employees much
needed job security, have little to no effect on upper level executives-who probably

15 See Rem Metals Corp. v. Logan, 565 P.2d 1080, 1082 83 (Or. 1977),
O'Neill, supra note 15, at 86.
Lake Land Emp't Grp. v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ohio 2004).
Davies & Davies Agency, Inc. v. Davies, 298 N.W2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980) ("Those cases which
have held that continued employment is not a sufficient consideration stress the fact that an employee
frequently has no bargaining power once he is employed and can easily be coerced.").
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already have written employment contracts-and would still protect employers'
legitimate business interests.
If courts use the legitimate business prong to evaluate the necessity of a noncompete agreement, and include whether there is a written employment agreement
that an employee may only be fired for just cause, the analysis could turn on a clear,
objective factor that is already incorporated into most states' analyses of whether a
non-compete agreement is enforceable. This will lead to standardized outcomes
across the United States, instead of the varying standards used currently. As
mentioned previously, a variety of jurisdictions use differing approaches to address
concerns with equity. These approaches range from using preliminary injunction
requirements to address equity, 12 to considering the hardship that will be placed on
13
an employee if a non-compete agreement is enforced.' While these approaches try
to address the power differential between employers and employees, the differing
analyses can lead to different outcomes. These different outcomes result in workers
bound by non-compete agreements in some states facing harsher labor restrictions
than workers bound by non-compete agreements in other states. If a standard analysis
was used, there would not only be more uniformity in the court system, but also more
uniformity in the protection of workers in the labor force.
If the standard approach-to not enforce a non-compete agreement in scenarios
where there is no written employment agreement providing an employee can only be
fired for cause-is used, employees will have much needed job security and
flexibility. New York adopts a similar approach where the court will not enforce a
1 14
because an
non-compete agreement if an employee was fired without cause,
employer should not be able to use a non-compete agreement to "economically
cripple a former employee and simultaneously deny other potential employers his
services."' 5 This not only protects the job security of workers, but also allows them
economic freedom if their employer fires them without cause. But, the vast majority
of states do not have a similar built-in protection and are instead guided by the
6
principal of at-will employment that is dominant in the United States."I At-will
employment primarily favors employers by allowing them to terminate the employee
suddenly without cause."' 7 While this will still be the standard in the vast majority
of employment relationships, if an employer wants to bind an employee by a noncompete agreement, they will have to instead provide just cause termination. This
will give the one in five employees in the labor force bound by non-compete
agreements"' job security that they would not otherwise have. Because it will only
apply to employees that employers want to bind with non-compete agreements, it
will allow employers to make intentional decisions on whether an employee is
highly-skilled enough or valuable enough that a non-compete agreement is necessary
to protect their businesses. This change will also give employees more flexibility
"'

Lantech.com v. Yarbrough, 247 F. App'x 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2007).
Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa. 1957).

Morgan's
...

114 Buchanan Capital Mkts., L.L.C. v. DeLucca, 41 N.Y.S.3d 229, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
115 Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc,, 397 N.E.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. 1979).
'', See Stone, supra note 33, at 84.

'7id
"' Starr et al., supra note 2.
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regarding what industries they can work in following termination by their previous
employer. While non-compete agreements must be reasonable in scope to be
enforceable,' 9 meaning a non-compete agreement will not be enforceable if it
prevents the employee from working entirely, they can prevent employees from
working in specific areas of the workforce-jobs they are likely the most qualified
for. Instead, this new approach would allow employees to compete for the jobs that
they are already skilled in and probably provide greater pay than would otherwise be
available in an industry where they have not previously worked. Both the greater job
security and greater flexibility will be beneficial for employees in the labor force.
This new approach would also still protect employers' other legitimate business
interests. In the past, employers used non-compete agreements almost exclusively to
protect themselves from the departure of highly skilled workers. 12" Now, employers
are using non-compete agreements with employees without bachelor's degrees and
any specific skill set.1 21 Non-compete agreements can still be used by employers to
protect against the departure of highly skilled workers, in conjunction with a written
employment agreement, which is probably already in place for most of these highly
skilled workers. Employers will have to address non-skilled workers differently and
be more cognizant about whether a non-compete agreement is necessary to protect
their legitimate business interests. More broadly, the purpose of using a non-compete
agreement, from an employer's perspective, is to preserve the value of its assets,
protect client lists and confidential information or help gain trade secret protection,
and protect investment in employee training. 122 Employers can still do a number of
these things even if the new approach is adopted. While employers want to preserve
relationships with valuable employees, this reasoning is susceptible to criticism if
that employer terminates an employee without cause. If an employee is a valuable,
contributing member of a workforce, but is terminated without cause, the employer
should no longer be allowed to control the employee's employment decisions as the
relationship was voluntarily terminated by the employer. Client lists and trade secret
information can still be protected by using other forms of trade restrictions. For
example, trade secrets are already protected by statute if certain requirements are
met,123 but many employers still contract with their employees not to disclose trade
secrets. 24 This contractual agreement is separate entirely from a non-compete
agreement and would still be enforceable through preliminary injunction or
otherwise under the new approach. A provision regarding trade secrets and a
provision addressing the taking of clients could be incorporated into the written
agreement that allows a non-compete agreement to be enforceable only if the
employee is fired for cause. Lastly, employers can still invest in employee training
without the use of non-compete agreements. At least one court already provides that
training is not a legitimate business interest enforceable by a non-compete agreement
if the training only provides general knowledge or skills necessary to perform a
Reeves v. Sargeant, 21 S.E.2d 184, 188 (S.C. 1942).
1I Starr et al., supra note 2, at 2 3.
121Id. at 17 18.
121 See id. at 7 8.
...18 U.SC.A. § 1832 (West 2016),
121Id. at 2.
",
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job.125 Therefore, training is only covered by non-compete agreements if the
employer is training the employee in a specific process that is meaningfully different
from other employers' processes. 126 If an employer's training falls in this category,
it can still decide if a non-compete agreement is necessary and will only have to
provide a written employment agreement for that non-compete agreement to be
enforceable.
Additionally, this will not impact high-level executives that are already bound by
non-compete agreements. These executives already have extensive written
employment contracts outlining salary, benefits, stock ownership, and for cause
termination, among other things. Under the new approach-where written
employment contracts outlining for cause termination are necessary for non-compete
agreements to be enforceable-non-compete agreements will be readily enforceable
against high-level executives, just as they are now.
CONCLUSION

In the past, courts have used a variety of approaches to address the lack of equity
and differentials in bargaining power in the non-compete agreement setting. While
the approaches have different triggering factors, such as whether the employee was
2
12 7
whether the reason for the firing was justified, " or
terminated without cause,
29
whether there was a power differential between parties,1 each approach is based in

a theory of equity. Although employers justify the use of non-compete agreements
to protect confidential information about their workplaces, or as a retention strategy
to retain the highest-value employees, 13 0 these justifications seem like pretext when
an employer can still fire the employee without cause and with no hardship. In the
United States, at-will employment reigns supreme, leaving many workers with no
choice but to accept the terms of at-will employment and any non-compete
agreements involved, as a condition precedent of employment. The combination of
the dominance of at-will employment in the United States' labor force and the
willingness of the courts to enforce non-compete agreements as long as they meet
some basic restrictions severely harms the average American worker. Courts are
understandably wary about adopting an approach that would require specifically
analyzing the bargaining power differential between employees and an employer,' 31
and courts are trending away from using consideration as an inquiry into the fairness
132
Because non-compete
of the enforcement of the non-compete agreement.
agreements are a creature of state law, it is necessary to adopt an approach that can
easily fit into the existing framework found in state law precedent.
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747

The approach that would not allow enforcement of non-compete agreements
without the employer offering a written employment contract, where the employee
may only be fired for just cause, fits into the existing framework of state precedent
and integrates a number of public policy, power differential, and equity concerns into
a simple objective factor. This approach could easily be applied by courts, would
provide both employees and employers with protection from undue burdens, and
would standardize the outcomes in non-compete enforcement cases across the nation.

